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UID:/NewsandEvents/Archives/2010/newsitem/3336/4-M
 ay-2010-RISC-Seminar-Professor-Ron-Rivest-MIT-
DTSTAMP:20100420T000000
SUMMARY:RISC Seminar, Professor Ron Rivest (MIT)
ATTENDEE;ROLE=Speaker:Professor Ron Rivest (MIT)
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Amsterdam:20100504T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Amsterdam:20100504T170000
LOCATION:Turing room, CWI (Main Auditorium (Z011),
  ground floor), Science Park 123, Amsterdam
DESCRIPTION:While running an election sounds simpl
 e, it is in fact extremely challenging. Not only a
 re there millions of voters to be authenticated an
 d millions of votes to be carefully collected, cou
 nted, and stored, there are now millions of "votin
 g machines" containing millions of lines of code t
 o be evaluated for security vulnerabilities. Moreo
 ver, voting systems have a unique requirement: the
  voter must not be given a "receipt" that would al
 low them to prove how they voted to someone else -
  otherwise the voter could be coerced or bribed in
 to voting a certain way. This lack of receipts mak
 es the design of secure voting system much more ch
 allenging than, say, the security of banking syste
 ms (where receipts are the norm).  For more inform
 ation, see http://projects.cwi.nl/crypto/risc.html
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\n        <p>While ru
 nning an election sounds simple, it is in fact\n  
       extremely challenging.  Not only are there m
 illions of voters\n        to be authenticated and
  millions of votes to be carefully\n        collec
 ted, counted, and stored, there are now millions o
 f\n        &quot;voting machines&quot; containing 
 millions of lines of code to be\n        evaluated
  for security vulnerabilities.  Moreover, voting\n
         systems have a unique requirement: the vot
 er must not be given\n        a &quot;receipt&quot
 ; that would allow them to prove how they voted to
 \n        someone else - otherwise the voter could
  be coerced or bribed\n        into voting a certa
 in way. This lack of receipts makes the\n        d
 esign of secure voting system much more challengin
 g than,\n        say, the security of banking syst
 ems (where receipts are the\n        norm).</p>\n 
    \n        <p>For more information, see <a targe
 t="_blank" href="http://projects.cwi.nl/crypto/ris
 c.html">http://projects.cwi.nl/crypto/risc.html</a
 ></p>\n    
URL:/NewsandEvents/Archives/2010/newsitem/3336/4-M
 ay-2010-RISC-Seminar-Professor-Ron-Rivest-MIT-
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