BEGIN:VCALENDAR VERSION:2.0 PRODID:ILLC Website X-WR-TIMEZONE:Europe/Amsterdam BEGIN:VTIMEZONE TZID:Europe/Amsterdam X-LIC-LOCATION:Europe/Amsterdam BEGIN:DAYLIGHT TZOFFSETFROM:+0100 TZOFFSETTO:+0200 TZNAME:CEST DTSTART:19700329T020000 RRULE:FREQ=YEARLY;BYMONTH=3;BYDAY=-1SU END:DAYLIGHT BEGIN:STANDARD TZOFFSETFROM:+0200 TZOFFSETTO:+0100 TZNAME:CET DTSTART:19701025T030000 RRULE:FREQ=YEARLY;BYMONTH=10;BYDAY=-1SU END:STANDARD END:VTIMEZONE BEGIN:VEVENT UID:/NewsandEvents/Archives/2010/newsitem/3336/4-M ay-2010-RISC-Seminar-Professor-Ron-Rivest-MIT- DTSTAMP:20100420T000000 SUMMARY:RISC Seminar, Professor Ron Rivest (MIT) ATTENDEE;ROLE=Speaker:Professor Ron Rivest (MIT) DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Amsterdam:20100504T160000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/Amsterdam:20100504T170000 LOCATION:Turing room, CWI (Main Auditorium (Z011), ground floor), Science Park 123, Amsterdam DESCRIPTION:While running an election sounds simpl e, it is in fact extremely challenging. Not only a re there millions of voters to be authenticated an d millions of votes to be carefully collected, cou nted, and stored, there are now millions of "votin g machines" containing millions of lines of code t o be evaluated for security vulnerabilities. Moreo ver, voting systems have a unique requirement: the voter must not be given a "receipt" that would al low them to prove how they voted to someone else - otherwise the voter could be coerced or bribed in to voting a certain way. This lack of receipts mak es the design of secure voting system much more ch allenging than, say, the security of banking syste ms (where receipts are the norm). For more inform ation, see http://projects.cwi.nl/crypto/risc.html X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\n
While ru nning an election sounds simple, it is in fact\n extremely challenging. Not only are there m illions of voters\n to be authenticated and millions of votes to be carefully\n collec ted, counted, and stored, there are now millions o f\n "voting machines" containing millions of lines of code to be\n evaluated for security vulnerabilities. Moreover, voting\n systems have a unique requirement: the vot er must not be given\n a "receipt" ; that would allow them to prove how they voted to \n someone else - otherwise the voter could be coerced or bribed\n into voting a certa in way. This lack of receipts makes the\n d esign of secure voting system much more challengin g than,\n say, the security of banking syst ems (where receipts are the\n norm).
\n \nFor more information, see http://projects.cwi.nl/crypto/risc.html
URL:/NewsandEvents/Archives/2010/newsitem/3336/4-M ay-2010-RISC-Seminar-Professor-Ron-Rivest-MIT- END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR