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UID:/NewsandEvents/Archives/2010/newsitem/3422/17-
June-2010-One-Way-Flow-Nash-Networks-Frank-Thuijsm
an-Maastricht-University-
DTSTAMP:20100610T000000
SUMMARY:One-Way Flow Nash Networks, Frank Thuijsma
n (Maastricht University)
ATTENDEE;ROLE=Speaker:Frank Thuijsman (Maastricht
University)
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Amsterdam:20100617T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Amsterdam:20100617T000000
LOCATION:room L016, CWI, Science Park 123, Amsterd
am
DESCRIPTION:We discuss the one-way flow model of d
ynamic network formation games. Here the nodes in
the network correspond to agents, while the direct
ed arcs indicate the flow of profits to these agen
ts. At discrete moments in time agents can choose
from any of the local actions: (1) passing (i.e. n
ot changing anything), (2) adding a link, (3) remo
ving a link, or (4) replacing a link, where each a
gent can only choose from the links pointing at hi
m. In any given network a payoff for each agent is
calculated as the total of profits flowing to his
node minus the costs for the links directed at hi
s node. We prove the existence of Nash networks fo
r the case of owner-homogeneous costs and we discu
ss a procedure of local improvements that leads to
a Nash network in finitely many steps. Finally, w
e discuss an example to illustrate that Nash netwo
rks fail to exist if costs are heterogeneous, even
if they are ε close to owner-homogeneity. For mo
re information, contact k.r.apt at cwi.nl
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\n We discu
ss the one-way flow model of dynamic network\n
formation games. Here the nodes in the networ
k correspond to\n agents, while the directe
d arcs indicate the flow of profits\n to th
ese agents. At discrete moments in time agents can
choose\n from any of the local actions: (1
) passing (i.e. not changing\n anything), (
2) adding a link, (3) removing a link, or (4)\n
replacing a link, where each agent can only c
hoose from the\n links pointing at him. In
any given network a payoff for each\n agent
is calculated as the total of profits flowing to
his\n node minus the costs for the links di
rected at his node. We\n prove the existen
ce of Nash networks for the case of\n owner
-homogeneous costs and we discuss a procedure of l
ocal\n improvements that leads to a Nash ne
twork in finitely many\n steps. Finally, w
e discuss an example to illustrate that Nash\n
networks fail to exist if costs are heterogene
ous, even if\n they are ε close to
owner-homogeneity.

\n \n For more
information, contact k.r.apt at cwi.nl

\n
URL:/NewsandEvents/Archives/2010/newsitem/3422/17-
June-2010-One-Way-Flow-Nash-Networks-Frank-Thuijsm
an-Maastricht-University-
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