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UID:/NewsandEvents/Archives/2010/newsitem/3422/17-
 June-2010-One-Way-Flow-Nash-Networks-Frank-Thuijsm
 an-Maastricht-University-
DTSTAMP:20100610T000000
SUMMARY:One-Way Flow Nash Networks, Frank Thuijsma
 n (Maastricht University)
ATTENDEE;ROLE=Speaker:Frank Thuijsman (Maastricht 
 University)
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Amsterdam:20100617T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Amsterdam:20100617T000000
LOCATION:room L016, CWI, Science Park 123, Amsterd
 am
DESCRIPTION:We discuss the one-way flow model of d
 ynamic network formation games. Here the nodes in 
 the network correspond to agents, while the direct
 ed arcs indicate the flow of profits to these agen
 ts. At discrete moments in time agents can choose 
 from any of the local actions: (1) passing (i.e. n
 ot changing anything), (2) adding a link, (3) remo
 ving a link, or (4) replacing a link, where each a
 gent can only choose from the links pointing at hi
 m. In any given network a payoff for each agent is
  calculated as the total of profits flowing to his
  node minus the costs for the links directed at hi
 s node. We prove the existence of Nash networks fo
 r the case of owner-homogeneous costs and we discu
 ss a procedure of local improvements that leads to
  a Nash network in finitely many steps. Finally, w
 e discuss an example to illustrate that Nash netwo
 rks fail to exist if costs are heterogeneous, even
  if they are ε close to owner-homogeneity.  For mo
 re information, contact k.r.apt at cwi.nl
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\n        <p>We discu
 ss the one-way flow model of dynamic network\n    
     formation games.  Here the nodes in the networ
 k correspond to\n        agents, while the directe
 d arcs indicate the flow of profits\n        to th
 ese agents. At discrete moments in time agents can
  choose\n        from any of the local actions: (1
 ) passing (i.e. not changing\n        anything), (
 2) adding a link, (3) removing a link, or (4)\n   
      replacing a link, where each agent can only c
 hoose from the\n        links pointing at him. In 
 any given network a payoff for each\n        agent
  is calculated as the total of profits flowing to 
 his\n        node minus the costs for the links di
 rected at his node.  We\n        prove the existen
 ce of Nash networks for the case of\n        owner
 -homogeneous costs and we discuss a procedure of l
 ocal\n        improvements that leads to a Nash ne
 twork in finitely many\n        steps.  Finally, w
 e discuss an example to illustrate that Nash\n    
     networks fail to exist if costs are heterogene
 ous, even if\n        they are &epsilon; close to 
 owner-homogeneity.</p>\n    \n        <p>For more 
 information, contact <a class="email">k.r.apt <spa
 n class="at">at</span> cwi.nl</a></p>\n    
URL:/NewsandEvents/Archives/2010/newsitem/3422/17-
 June-2010-One-Way-Flow-Nash-Networks-Frank-Thuijsm
 an-Maastricht-University-
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