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UID:/NewsandEvents/Archives/2010/newsitem/3540/20-
 September-2010-Public-communication-in-games-of-im
 perfect-information-Sunil-Simon
DTSTAMP:20100912T000000
SUMMARY:Public communication in games of imperfect
  information, Sunil Simon
ATTENDEE;ROLE=Speaker:Sunil Simon
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Amsterdam:20100920T110000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Amsterdam:20100920T000000
LOCATION:CWI, Science Park 123, Room L017
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: The standard way of modellin
 g imperfect information in games is in terms of in
 formation partitions for players. In this view, ea
 ch player is associated with an equivalence relati
 on over the set of game positions. For multi-playe
 r games of imperfect information defined in this m
 anner it turns out that most of the interesting al
 gorithmic questions like determining the winning s
 trategy and synthesis of an equilibrium profile ar
 e undecidable. The crucial element which yields un
 decidability is the ability of the game model to i
 mplicitly encode arbitrary private communication b
 etween players. In this light, we propose a model 
 where the players' information partitions are gene
 rated explicitly by means of communication. We def
 ine a notion of locally consistent equilibrium and
  suggest that this better captures the intuition o
 f stable behaviour of players. We show that when c
 ommunication is by means of public announcements, 
 it is decidable to check whether locally consisten
 t equilibrium profile exists.    This work is join
 t with R. Ramanujam (IMSc., Chennai).  For more in
 formation, contact Krzysztof Apt at apt at cwi.nl.
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\n        <p>Abstract
 : The standard way of modelling imperfect informat
 ion in games\n        is in terms of information p
 artitions for players. In this view, each\n       
  player is associated with an equivalence relation
  over the set of game\n        positions. For mult
 i-player games of imperfect information defined in
 \n        this manner it turns out that most of th
 e interesting algorithmic\n        questions like 
 determining the winning strategy and synthesis of 
 an\n        equilibrium profile are undecidable. T
 he crucial element which yields\n        undecidab
 ility is the ability of the game model to implicit
 ly encode\n        arbitrary private communication
  between players. In this light, we\n        propo
 se a model where the players' information partitio
 ns are\n        generated explicitly by means of c
 ommunication. We define a notion of\n        local
 ly consistent equilibrium and suggest that this be
 tter captures\n        the intuition of stable beh
 aviour of players. We show that when\n        comm
 unication is by means of public announcements, it 
 is decidable to\n        check whether locally con
 sistent equilibrium profile exists.\n        </p>\
 n        <p>\n        This work is joint with R. R
 amanujam (IMSc., Chennai).</p>\n    \n        <p>F
 or more information, contact Krzysztof Apt at <a c
 lass="email">apt <span class="at">at</span> cwi.nl
 </a>.</p>\n    
URL:/NewsandEvents/Archives/2010/newsitem/3540/20-
 September-2010-Public-communication-in-games-of-im
 perfect-information-Sunil-Simon
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