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UID:/NewsandEvents/Archives/2010/newsitem/3616/4-N
 ovember-2010-Empirical-Game-Theoretic-Analysis-for
 -Practical-Strategic-Reasoning-Michael-Wellman
DTSTAMP:20101028T000000
SUMMARY:Empirical Game-Theoretic Analysis for Prac
 tical Strategic Reasoning, Michael Wellman
ATTENDEE;ROLE=Speaker:Michael Wellman
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Amsterdam:20101104T110000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Amsterdam:20101104T000000
LOCATION:Room L016 ('Hypathia'), CWI, Science Park
  123, Amsterdam
DESCRIPTION:The games agents play - in markets, co
 nflicts, or most other contexts - often defy stric
 t game-theoretic analysis. Games may be unmanageab
 ly large (combinatorial or infinite state or actio
 n spaces), and present severely imperfect informat
 ion, which could be further complicated by partial
  dynamic revelation. Moreover, the game may be spe
 cified procedurally, for instance by a simulator, 
 rather than in an explicit game form.   With colle
 agues and students over the past few years, I have
  been developing a body of techniques for strategi
 c analysis, adopting the game-theoretic framework 
 but employing it in domains where direct "model-an
 d-solve" cannot apply. This empirical game-theoret
 ic methodology embraces simulation, approximation,
  statistics and learning, and search. Through appl
 ications to canonical auction games, and rich trad
 ing scenarios, we demonstrate the value of empiric
 al methods for extending the scope of game-theoret
 ic analysis. This perspective also sheds insight i
 nto behavioral models and bases for predicting joi
 nt action in complex multiagent scenarios.  For mo
 re information, contact H.van.Hasselt at cwi.nl
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\n        <p>The game
 s agents play - in markets, conflicts, or most oth
 er\n        contexts - often defy strict game-theo
 retic analysis. Games may\n        be unmanageably
  large (combinatorial or infinite state or\n      
   action spaces), and present severely imperfect i
 nformation,\n        which could be further compli
 cated by partial dynamic\n        revelation. More
 over, the game may be specified procedurally,\n   
      for instance by a simulator, rather than in a
 n explicit game\n        form.</p>\n        <p>\n 
        With colleagues and students over the past 
 few years, I have\n        been developing a body 
 of techniques for strategic analysis,\n        ado
 pting the game-theoretic framework but employing i
 t in\n        domains where direct "model-and-solv
 e" cannot apply. This\n        empirical game-theo
 retic methodology embraces simulation,\n        ap
 proximation, statistics and learning, and search. 
  Through\n        applications to canonical auctio
 n games, and rich trading\n        scenarios, we d
 emonstrate the value of empirical methods for\n   
      extending the scope of game-theoretic analysi
 s.  This\n        perspective also sheds insight i
 nto behavioral models and\n        bases for predi
 cting joint action in complex multiagent\n        
 scenarios.</p>\n    \n        <p>For more informat
 ion, contact <a class="email">H.van.Hasselt <span 
 class="at">at</span> cwi.nl</a></p>\n    
URL:/NewsandEvents/Archives/2010/newsitem/3616/4-N
 ovember-2010-Empirical-Game-Theoretic-Analysis-for
 -Practical-Strategic-Reasoning-Michael-Wellman
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