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UID:/NewsandEvents/Archives/2010/newsitem/3687/10-
 December-2010-Discrete-Strategies-in-Keyword-Aucti
 ons-and-their-Social-Inefficiency-Orestis-Telelis-
 U-Liverpool-UK-
DTSTAMP:20101128T000000
SUMMARY:Discrete Strategies in Keyword Auctions an
 d their Social Inefficiency, Orestis Telelis (U Li
 verpool, UK)
ATTENDEE;ROLE=Speaker:Orestis Telelis (U Liverpool
 , UK)
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Amsterdam:20101210T110000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Amsterdam:20101210T000000
LOCATION:room L016, CWI, Science Park 123, Amsterd
 am
DESCRIPTION:We study formally discrete bidding str
 ategies for the game induced by the Generalized Se
 cond Price (GSP) keyword auction mechanism. Such s
 trategies have seen experimental evaluation in the
  recent literature within iterative best response 
 procedures, which have been shown not to converge.
    We give a detailed definition of iterative best
  response under these strategies and, under approp
 riate discretization of the players' strategy spac
 es we find that the discretized configurations spa
 ce contains socially optimal pure Nash equilibria.
  We cast discrete strategies under a new light, by
  studying their performance for bidders that act b
 ased on local information; we prove bounds for the
  worst-case ratio of the social welfare of locally
  stable configurations, relative to the socially o
 ptimum welfare. Finally we discuss open problems r
 egarding convergence of discrete strategies and th
 e social welfare of stable configurations for Keyw
 ord Auctions under the GSP mechanism.  For more in
 formation, contact k.r.apt at cwi.nl
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\n        <p>We study
  formally discrete bidding strategies for the game
 \n        induced by the Generalized Second Price 
 (GSP) keyword auction\n        mechanism. Such str
 ategies have seen experimental evaluation\n       
  in the recent literature within iterative best re
 sponse\n        procedures, which have been shown 
 not to converge.\n        </p>\n        <p>We give
  a detailed definition of iterative best response\
 n        under these strategies and, under appropr
 iate discretization\n        of the players' strat
 egy spaces we find that the\n        discretized c
 onfigurations space contains socially optimal\n   
      pure Nash equilibria. We cast discrete strate
 gies under a new\n        light, by studying their
  performance for bidders that act\n        based o
 n local information; we prove bounds for the worst
 -case\n        ratio of the social welfare of loca
 lly stable configurations,\n        relative to th
 e socially optimum welfare. Finally we discuss\n  
       open problems regarding convergence of discr
 ete strategies and\n        the social welfare of 
 stable configurations for Keyword\n        Auction
 s under the GSP mechanism.</p>\n    \n        <p>F
 or more information, contact <a class="email">k.r.
 apt <span class="at">at</span> cwi.nl</a></p>\n   
  
URL:/NewsandEvents/Archives/2010/newsitem/3687/10-
 December-2010-Discrete-Strategies-in-Keyword-Aucti
 ons-and-their-Social-Inefficiency-Orestis-Telelis-
 U-Liverpool-UK-
END:VEVENT
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