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UID:/NewsandEvents/Archives/2005/newsitem/898/5-Ap
 ril-2005-Statistical-Inference-the-Problem-of-Indu
 ction-and-the-Realism-Debate-Jan-Willem-Romeyn
DTSTAMP:20050331T000000
SUMMARY:Statistical Inference, the Problem of Indu
 ction, and the Realism Debate, Jan-Willem Romeyn
ATTENDEE;ROLE=Speaker:Jan-Willem Romeyn
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Amsterdam:20050405T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Amsterdam:20050405T000000
LOCATION:Department of Psychology, Roeterstraat 15
 , A 102
DESCRIPTION:Science infers general statements and 
 predictions from limited bodies of empirical evide
 nce, and it therefore faces the problem of inducti
 on. Statistics plays an important role in how scie
 nce solves this problem. In my talk I first make p
 recise what role it plays, and then investigate th
 e extent to which, in this role, it can support th
 e realist ambitions of science.   The first task i
 nvolves a critical analysis of the logical empiric
 ist views of Carnap, and a reformulation of induct
 ive inferences as Bayesian logical arguments. The 
 second involves a reversed application of De Finet
 ti's representation theorem, and a rather delicate
  mix of his strict subjectivism with the frequenti
 st theory. However, these reform measures do not y
 et go far enough. In the last part of the talk wil
 l argue that scientists have good reasons for empl
 oying underdetermined statistical models.    For m
 ore information, please contact j.w.romeijn at uva
 .nl
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\n      <p>\n        
 Science infers general statements and predictions 
 from limited bodies of empirical evidence, and it 
 therefore faces the problem of induction. Statisti
 cs plays an important role in how science solves t
 his problem. In my talk I first make precise what 
 role it plays, and then investigate the extent to 
 which, in this role, it can support the realist am
 bitions of science.\n      </p>\n      <p>The firs
 t task involves a critical analysis of the logical
  empiricist views of Carnap, and a reformulation o
 f inductive inferences as Bayesian logical argumen
 ts. The second involves a reversed application of 
 De Finetti's representation theorem, and a rather 
 delicate mix of his strict subjectivism with the f
 requentist theory. However, these reform measures 
 do not yet go far enough. In the last part of the 
 talk will argue that scientists have good reasons 
 for employing underdetermined statistical models.\
 n      </p>\n    \n      <p>\n        For more inf
 ormation, please contact <a class="email">j.w.rome
 ijn <span class="at">at</span> uva.nl</a>\n      <
 /p>\n    
URL:/NewsandEvents/Archives/2005/newsitem/898/5-Ap
 ril-2005-Statistical-Inference-the-Problem-of-Indu
 ction-and-the-Realism-Debate-Jan-Willem-Romeyn
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