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BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:/NewsandEvents/Archives/2018/newsitem/9888/30-
 April-2018-ILLC-Seminar-Dorothea-Baumeister
DTSTAMP:20190307T164615
SUMMARY:ILLC Seminar, Dorothea Baumeister
ATTENDEE;ROLE=Speaker:Dorothea Baumeister
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Amsterdam:20180430T140000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Amsterdam:20180430T145000
LOCATION:ILLC Seminar Room F1.15, Science Park 107
 , Amsterdam
DESCRIPTION:This talk will give a short introducti
 on into computational social choice, an interdisci
 plinary field that lies at the interface between s
 ocial choice theory and computer science. Afterwar
 ds the focus is on two different problems of colle
 ctive decision making. The study of such problems 
 is extremely important, since there are many situa
 tion where a collective decision based on individu
 al preferences has to be made. The first part of t
 his talk deals with the modeling of online partici
 pation processes and their properties. They will b
 e formalized by abstract argumentation frameworks,
  where incompleteness is added to the initial mode
 l. This extension is more suitable to capture the 
 dynamics of such processes. In this context the ve
 rification problem is particularly important, thus
  its computational complexity will be analyzed for
  different variants. The second part of the talk f
 ocuses on the algorithmic and axiomatic study of c
 ommittee elections. Committee election rules for d
 ifferent forms of votes that try to minimize the v
 oters’ dissatisfaction will be introduced. Afterwa
 rds its axiomatic and algorithmic properties are e
 xplored.
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\n  <p>This talk will
  give a short introduction into computational soci
 al choice, an interdisciplinary field that lies at
  the interface between social choice theory and co
 mputer science. Afterwards the focus is on two dif
 ferent problems of collective decision making. The
  study of such problems is extremely important, si
 nce there are many situation where a collective de
 cision based on individual preferences has to be m
 ade. The first part of this talk deals with the mo
 deling of online participation processes and their
  properties. They will be formalized by abstract a
 rgumentation frameworks, where incompleteness is a
 dded to the initial model. This extension is more 
 suitable to capture the dynamics of such processes
 . In this context the verification problem is part
 icularly important, thus its computational complex
 ity will be analyzed for different variants. The s
 econd part of the talk focuses on the algorithmic 
 and axiomatic study of committee elections. Commit
 tee election rules for different forms of votes th
 at try to minimize the voters’ dissatisfaction wil
 l be introduced. Afterwards its axiomatic and algo
 rithmic properties are explored.</p>\n
URL:/NewsandEvents/Archives/2018/newsitem/9888/30-
 April-2018-ILLC-Seminar-Dorothea-Baumeister
CONTACT:Yde Venema at Y.Venema at uva.nl
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