Strategy and Manipulation in Medieval Elections
Sara Uckelman, Joel Uckelman

Abstract:
When developing electoral protocols, desiderata include a system which
is transparent, non-manipulable, honest, and not open to
strategizing. However, these desiderata are in tension with each
other: Often, transparent electoral procedures are the least strategy
resistant, and many honest procedures encourage manipulation.  Thus, a
balance between these different goals must be sought. In modern times,
since the seminal result on vote manipulation, the
Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem, much attention has been devoted to
developing voting rules where manipulation is never in the best
interest of the voters, or which are computationally too complex for
the average bounded agent to be able to manipulate.  In medieval
times, such computational routes were generally not available, meaning
that other constraints had to be put in place to discourage
strategizing and manipulation.  We discuss various voting rules and
electoral procedures used in the Middle Ages in both ecclesiastical
and secular context, highlighting some protocols with unique
properties.