Independence Weakening in Judgment Aggregation Kian Mintz-Woo Abstract: The fields of preference aggregation and judgment aggregation have strong parallels. In both fields, given certain plausible conditions, there are no aggregators that can universally output consistent and complete results. Several methods of avoiding these impossibility results have been proffered. In preference aggregation, weakening the condition known as Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives has been suggested by Campbell & Kelly (2007), among others. In judgment aggregation, the analogue to Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives is called Independence. Despite the fact that judgment aggregation has this analogue to Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives, weakenings of Campbell & Kelly’s type have not been explored. We argue that weak independence conditions are more defensible in judgment aggregation contexts than in preference aggregation contexts and show that the results of weakening independence allow for further possibilities. In line with Campbell & Kelly’s approach, we propose several weakenings of Independence, and characterize these weakenings in terms of dependent sets. We show that, under a weak version of Neutrality, the implications which hold between Campbell & Kelly’s (2007) conditions fail to transfer to the judgment aggregation framework. We demonstrate possibility with several of these weakenings and show that the aggregators are applicable. However, a stronger version of Neutrality leads to an impossibility theorem and recreates one of Campbell & Kelly’s implications. We also determine that Self-Dependence leads to impossibility over non-simple agendas.