Unrestricted Fusion and Unrestricted Quantification: Mereological Essentialism and the Universe
Elias Bronner

Abstract:
Salvatore Florio and Øystein Linnebo have recently put forward an argument against unrestricted comprehension in plural logic using plausible assumptions. Since mereology and plural logic are similar from a formal point of view, the question naturally arises whether this argument can be replicated in mereology with the conclusion that Unrestricted Fusion has to be restricted. This thesis investigates whether the assumptions can be motivated in the case of mereology by taking an in-depth look at the literature and by arguing against Florio and Linnebo’s claim regarding the modal profile of mereological fusions. It is shown, that one of the assumptions is difficult to motivate and that, without it, the argument does not work. However, if the assumption is granted, the argument succeeds and shows that, contrary to defenders of Unrestricted Fusion, that there is a well-motivated way to restrict Unrestricted Fusion.