Incompatible Objects and Possible Languages
Ruiting Hu

Abstract:
Eklund has put forward maximalism as an ontology for neo-Fregeanism (Eklund, 2006b). He claims this to be a promiscuous ontology that sanctions the existence of any object that is referred to by a singular term in a possible language. Like neo-Fregeanism, maximalism suffers a problem similar to the Bad Company problem. It is called the problem of incompatible objects. This thesis dives into the details of maximalism and seeks a solution for the problem of incompatible objects. Chapter 1 explores the cause for the problem of incompatible objects along with the metaonological principle that motivates maximalism. Chapter 2 considers Linnebo’s critical liberalism (Linnebo, 2024) and quantifier variance (Eklund, 2021) as solutions to the problem of incompatible objects and argues that it is inadequate. Chapter 3 puts forward our two solution to the problem with one appealing to the existence of similar but different objects and the other to pragmatic indeterminacy.