CfP special issue of Topoi on "Inferences and Proofs"
Since its birth, logic has been concerned with the study of correct reasonings or, more specifically, of proofs. A proof should have the epistemic power to provide us with justification for the judgement or assertion which it ends with. This power is, from a different point of view, the power to compel one to accept the conclusion of the proof. Which forms of reasoning can be said to have such power? And above all, how can they exert an epistemic power of compulsion?
According to Descartes, a correct reasoning is nothing but a chain of valid inferences. The epistemic power of proofs should therefore depend on the epistemic power of valid inferences. The problem then becomes: what is a (valid) inference? And why do valid inferences have an epistemic force? These questions, far from being psychological in nature, rather involve epistemology, logic and mathematics.
TOPOI invites submissions to the special issue "Inferences and proofs", edited by Gabriella Crocco and Antonio Piccolomini d'Aragona. Main areas of interest: Dag Prawitz's proof-theoretic semantics and recent theory of grounds, Per Martin-Löf intuitionistic type theory, Category theory, Contextual approaches to epistemic issues, and Kurt Gödel's notion of absolute proof.