Universiteit van Amsterdam


Institute for Logic, Language and Computation

14 November 2018, Computational Social Choice Seminar, Yorgos Amanatidis

Speaker: Yorgos Amanatidis (CWI)
Title: Comparing Approximate Relaxations of Envy-Freeness
Date: Wednesday 14 November 2018
Time: 16:00
Location: ILLC Seminar Room F1.15, Science Park 107, Amsterdam


In fair division problems with indivisible goods it is well known that one cannot have any guarantees for the classic fairness notions of envy-freeness and proportionality. As a result, several relaxations have been introduced, most of which in quite recent works. We focus on four such notions, namely envy-freeness up to one good (EF1), envy-freeness up to any good (EFX), maximin share fairness (MMS), and pairwise maximin share fairness (PMMS). Since obtaining these relaxations also turns out to be problematic in several scenarios, approximate versions of them have been considered. In this work, we investigate further the connections between the four notions mentioned above and their approximate versions. We establish several tight, or almost tight, results concerning the approximation quality that any of these notions guarantees for the others, providing an almost complete picture of this landscape. Some of our findings reveal interesting and surprising consequences regarding the power of these notions, e.g., PMMS and EFX provide the same worst-case guarantee for MMS, despite PMMS being a strictly stronger notion than EFX. We believe such implications provide further insight on the quality of approximately fair solutions.

For more information on the Computational Social Choice Seminar, please consult https://staff.science.uva.nl/u.endriss/seminar/.