28 August 2014 (corrected), Computational Social Choice Seminar, Olivier Cailloux

Abstract

When several members of a community have to decide on some issue, the y have to aggregate their preferences. This can be done using a so-called voting rule: a function which takes the preferences of each individual on a set of available alternatives and suggests a set of potential winners, a subset of the available alternatives. Different voting rules satisfy different properties and researchers have given arguments in favor or against different rules. These arguments are dispersed in the literature and aimed at the sophisticated reader, used to mathematical formalisms. We propose a way to integrate these arguments in a common language and reconstitute them in concrete terms in order to help individuals understand the strengths and weaknesses of different voting rules. We instantiate the approach by providing ways of arguing in favor of the Borda rule. (Joint work with Ulle Endriss.)

For more information, see http://www.illc.uva.nl/~ulle/seminar/ or contact Ulle Endriss (ulle.endriss at uva.nl).