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7 December 2022, Third Workshop on Proofs, Computation & Meaning: On the nature of proofs
Around thirty years after the fall of Hilbert's program, the proofs-as-programs paradigm established the view that a proof should not be identified, as in Hilbert's metamathematics, with a string of symbols in some formal system. Rather, proofs should consist in computational or epistemic objects conveying evidence to mathematical propositions. The relationship between formal derivations and proofs should then be analogous to the one between words and their meanings. This view naturally gives rise to questions such as “which conditions should a formal arrangement of symbols satisfy to represent a proof?” or “when do two formal derivations represent the same proof?". These questions underlie past and current research in proof theory both in the theoretical computer science community (e.g. categorical logic, domain theory, linear logic) and in the philosophy community (e.g. proof-theoretic semantics).
In spite of these common motivations and historical roots, it seems that today proof theorists in philosophy and in computer science are losing sight of each other. This workshop aims at contributing to a renaissance of the interaction between researchers with different backgrounds by establishing a constructive environment for exchanging views, problems and results.
The workshop series includes three events, each focusing on one specific aspect of proofs and their representation. To foster interaction and discussion, each event will consists in short talks followed by a 15 minutes slot during which participants can engage in discussion or just take a short break. The third workshop focuses on the nature of proofs.
Please note that this newsitem has been archived, and may contain outdated information or links.