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16 April 2019, EXPRESS Seminar, Filippo Ferrari

Abstract
The primary aim of this talk is to address the following question: in what sense and to what extent does the normativity of logic put pressure on logical anti-exceptionalism?
The talk is structured as follows: first I will introduce and briefly discuss a variety of dimensions of anti-exceptionalism; second I distinguish between different ways in which logic can be said to be normative (for reasoning); third, I discuss the relationships between anti-exceptionalism and logical normativity with the aim of substantiating the following conjecture: the normative function that logic exerts on reasoning is a threat to logical anti-exceptionalism only if it is conceived as a substantive and intrinsic aspect of the nature of logic.
I conclude by critically assessing the feasibility of two 'extrincisists' strategies: the first, adumbrated by Gillian Russell (Russell 2017), takes truth to be the extrinsic source of the normativity of logic; the second, which is due to Graham Priest (Priest 2016), takes rationality to play that role. If time permits, I sketch an alternative way to understand the normative function of logic—one that would make logic 'exceptional' only to a minimal extent.
This talk is partly based on a joint project with Sebastiano Moruzzi.
For more information, see https://inferentialexpressivism.com/seminar/ or contact Leïla Bussière at bussiere at sequitur.eu.
Please note that this newsitem has been archived, and may contain outdated information or links.