15 October 2021, Computational Social Choice Seminar, Zoi Terzopoulou

Abstract

Consider a group of agents that hold incomplete preferences over a set of alternatives (i.e., cannot compare some of them) and need to consensually select a winner amongst their options. A dynamic process in which the agents gradually complete their preferences by adopting the opinion of the majority may assist them in reaching the desired consensus. We explore such settings analytically and experimentally. We find that, unfortunately, majority dynamics are not always beneficial with respect to consensus, although they can often be so. We also study whether the chair of a group can manipulate the obtained consensus, by deciding the order in which the alternatives will be considered in the process—our relevant observations vary, depending on the consensus notions that are of interest.

For more information on the Computational Social Choice Seminar, please consult https://staff.science.uva.nl/u.endriss/seminar/.

We are now cautiously restarting on-campus sessions of the seminar. At the same time, we want to make it possible for people who prefer to still minimise their presence on campus to take part online. If you would like to participate online, please contact Ulle Endriss (ulle.endriss at uva.nl) at least 48 hours before the session so we can set things up.